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Game management areas in Zambia aim to combine 
nature conservation with economic empowerment of 
rural households. By looking at households inside and 
outside game management areas, this study advances the 
knowledge of the impact of community based natural 
resource management on household welfare. The paper 
focuses on the economic welfare of households living 
inside game management areas. It tries to answer the 
question: Do the households in game management 
areas enjoy higher levels of welfare relative to the 
conditions they would have been in had the area not 
been designated as a game management area? Within the 
game management area, the paper tries to determine the 
factors that influence household participation in natural 
resource management, and whether the participating 
households get any extra benefits. Also of interest is 
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whether such benefits of living in a game management 
area, and, once in such an area, those of participating 
accrue more to the poorer segments of the communities. 
The study finds that the gains from living in a game 
management area and from active participation in 
natural resource management are large but unevenly 
distributed. Only game management areas near Kasanka, 
Lavushi, Isangano, and South Luangwa national parks 
in the sample show significant benefits to general and 
participating households. And in those areas, the poor 
do not seem to gain even when they participate actively. 
More even distribution of gains from game management 
areas across households near different park systems and 
across the poor and the non-poor should be a continuing 
goal of national policy makers. 
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Strict protected area wildlife management programs have been complemented by community 
based natural resource management in many countries since the 1980s and 1990s. These 
efforts emerged as a result of international and local resistance to strict protected regimes and 
greater awareness of the difficulties of state-run conservation without engaging the local 
communities.  Community management of natural resources has the added advantage that it 
frees state resources at the center and allows for local political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization. Over the years international organizations and governments have invested in 
community based programs and institutions to help manage natural resources (USAID, 2003, 
UNDP-GEF, 2004, Shyamsundar et al. 2005, Emerton et al. 2005). 
 
Most community-based wildlife management programs try to meet at least two complex 
goals: conservation of nature, and economic empowerment of rural households.  To this end 
decentralization of wildlife management may be characterized by two overlapping phases. The 
first phase is sometimes called Integrated Conservation and Development Programs (ICDPs) 
and the second phase is known as community based natural resource management (CBNRM).  
Both programs create economic incentives for local communities to conserve natural 
resources. ICDP focuses on generating alternatives to nature-based economic activities in 
order to reduce the use of natural resources (Brandon and Wells, 1992). CBNRM emphasizes 
sustainable resource use through greater decision making power to the local communities. 
 
A Game Management Area (GMA) in Zambia is a buffer zone around a national park in which 
licensed safari and subsistence hunting is permitted. It is a communal area in which people 
live by semi-subsistence agriculture, coexisting with wildlife. The CBNRM program allows 
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to share hunting license revenue and wildlife 
management responsibilities with the communities living in GMAs. The communities allocate 
the revenue resources between employment of village scouts, and local infrastructure and 
developmental projects through Community Resource Boards (CRBs) and Village Action 
Groups (VAGs). 
 
The Government of the Republic of Zambia identifies tourism as one of the growth frontiers 
for the country. Several interventions have been introduced in the areas around the national 
parks designated as GMAs. However, the effectiveness of these interventions by government, 
private sector and the respective communities, and their impacts on the households’ living 
conditions remain unknown. Recent increases in nature tourism also beg the question whether 
nature tourism has had any impact on the welfare of the communities and households living in 
GMAs. This knowledge is the key to identifying strategies necessary for increasing the 
contribution of nature-based tourism to the gross domestic product. Lodges and campsites may 
employ local labor. Increased demand for handicraft and other nature based products may 
provide new enterprising opportunities. Traditional entertainment and culture may increase 
revenue potential from the tourists.   3
 
This paper focuses on the economic welfare of households living inside GMAs. It tries to 
answer the question, do the households in GMA enjoy higher levels of welfare relative to the 
conditions they would have been in had the area not been designated as a GMA? Within the 
GMA, the paper tries to determine the factors that influence household participation in 
CRB/VAG activities, and whether the participating households get any extra benefits. Also of 
interest is whether such benefits of living in the GMAs, and, once in the GMA, of 
participating in CRB/VAG activities (if they exist) accrue more to the poorer segments of the 
communities
1.   
 
To answer these questions, we use household and community level survey data from GMAs 
and other areas near national parks (non-GMAs). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 focuses on methods and procedure. Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 
4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
1.1  Background 
 
Zambia’s national parks and Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) were reorganized into national 
parks and GMAs in 1972 when the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968 came into force. 
Subsequently the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1991 replaced the 1968 version and in 
turn it was replaced by the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998. There were no substantial changes in 
the subsequent Acts in terms of national parks. The national parks are almost exclusively 
reserved for conservation and enhancement of wildlife, ecosystem, biodiversity and natural 
beauty. All forms of land use in GMAs are subject to provisions of management plans 
developed by CRBs (Zambia Wildlife Act, 1998, Section 7).  
 
The CBNRM program in Zambia evolved out of the ADMADE program financed by USAID 
in the 1990s. By 1997 the current community institutional structures were established. In this 
system, VAGs are composed of five to ten elected representatives from a cluster of villages of 
populations of 500-1,000. Each VAG elects its representative to sit on the CRB. Each CRB 
consists of 9-10 members and elects a chairperson. An officer of ZAWA is assigned to the 
area under a CRB, as its unit leader. 
 
The revenue stream to CRB originates from ZAWA and is called “Wildlife Conservation 
Revolving Funds (WCRF).” (ZAWA, 2007) Fifty percent of all ZAWA revenue is allocated to 
CRBs for community development out of which 5 percent goes directly to the chiefs. Each 
CRB may employ one or more local game scouts to assist ZAWA in enforcing anti-poaching 
regulations from the 45 percent allocation. CRBs enjoy wide latitude in deciding how the 
remaining WCRF is used.  
 
The early days of the CBNRM program witnessed widespread misappropriation of funds. 
(Astle, 1999, Grant Thornton Associates et al, 2005). In light of such criticisms of the 
CBNRM program, this study seeks to differentiate between the poor and the non-poor 
                                                 
1 In line with the primary justification for the establishment of the GMA institution.   4
households
2 and measure differences in welfare gains between poor and non-poor households 
that may be attributable to residing in GMA and participating in CRB/VAG activities. 
Estimations of welfare impacts for the poor and non-poor allow us to measure the possibility 
and extent of elite capture of benefits derived from the GMA within the communities. 
 
2.  Methods and Procedures 
2.1  Sample design and sampling 
 
The “Impact of Game Management Areas on Household Welfare” (IGMAW) survey was 
commissioned in 2006 to study the impact of the GMA institutions on the welfare of the 
households living in GMAs.  
 
The first step was to understand the nature and spatial distribution of Zambia’s national parks 
and game management areas. For logistical convenience, the national parks in the north and 
north-western parts of the country were omitted. For purposes of this survey the country’s 
remaining national parks were grouped into what came to be known as ‘park systems’, which 
in some cases constituted a combination of national parks that are within the same 
geographical location. The study was conducted in the GMAs of four park systems: 
 
a)  Bangweulu (including Kasanka, Lavushi, and Isangano national parks), 
b)  Kafue (Kafue, Blue Lagoon, and Lochinvar national parks), 
c)  Lower Zambezi (Lower Zambezi national park), and  
d)  Luangwa (North and South Luangwa national park)
3. 
 
Each of these park systems was regarded as a reporting domain in the sampling process. A 
stratified two-stage cluster sampling procedure was used, involving selection of SEAs (the 
clusters) at the first stage and selection of sample households from each selected SEA at the 
second stage. To sample the SEAs within the park systems, the GMA digital maps from 
ZAWA were overlaid on digital maps of standard enumeration areas (SEA) from the Central 
Statistical Office. The sampling frame of SEAs was drawn by selecting all the SEAs in the 
GMAs.  
 
ZAWA classifies its GMAs into five categories based on wildlife stock level (and tourist 
activity). To control for variation arising from the differences in stock levels, the sampling 
scheme recognized this stratification and sub-divided the frame of GMA SEAs into the five 
strata. However, the fifth stratum, depleted, was dropped after realizing that only one SEA was 
classified as such, leaving four GMA strata. To be able to decipher the impact of the 
interventions in the GMAs, the research design used all SEAs in non-GMA areas that border 
                                                 
2 The poor in this study are defined as households in the bottom two quintiles with respect to consumer durable 
asset values. Conversely, the top three quintile asset owning households are considered non-poor. This asset 
based indicator of poverty is based on indicators of household wealth as opposed to household income or 
consumption.  
3 Some GMAs in the northern edge of North Luangwa national park were dropped from the sample due to the 
absence of corresponding control areas close to the park.   5
the national parks (or park systems) as control SEAs. This brought the total number of (GMA 
and non-GMA) strata to five: 
 













 e)  Non-GMA 
 
A sample of 139 SEAs was drawn from the frame described above using probability 
proportional to size (PPS), where the size is based on the 2000 census of population and 
housing. The second stage of sampling was implemented using a list of households generated 
through a listing exercise, and a systematic probability sampling scheme. Two thousand eight 
hundred (2,800) households were sampled in total of which about half were from GMAs and 
the rest from non-GMAs. Very few observations (about 32) were lost due to non-response 
problems. Data were collected using household and community questionnaires, following a 
comprehensive pre-test in one non-sample GMA (Luano GMA) and one non-sample non-
GMA (East of Chongwe).  
 
2.2  Impact evaluation methods 
 
Many factors affect household welfare, and living in GMAs and participation in the 
CRB/VAGs are but some of them. Other factors include socio-demographic characteristics of 
the household, such as being female-headed, household size, age/sex composition of the 
members, the highest level of education within the household, etc. Yet other factors have 
community-wide effect on household welfare, such as levels of physical capital in 
infrastructure, social capital in community based organizations within the community, and 
access to markets. Under such circumstances, it is important to separate out the effects of the 
various confounding factors.  
 
Many of the same factors that affect household welfare also influence the probability that the 
household lives in a GMA, or, if in GMA, that the household participates in CRB/VAG 
decisions. Indeed, ‘selection bias’ arises because some households may choose to move into 
GMAs and social, economic, or other conditions may not allow some households to move out 
of GMAs. Once in the GMA, they self-select themselves to participate or not to participate in 
CRB/VAGs.  
 
Historical factors for creations of CHAs, which were later converted to GMAs, as well as 
criteria used by ZAWA to create recent GMAs are not always available in quantitative form, 
usable in the analysis. Such unobserved factors may also result in selection bias. One of the 
important implications of the selection bias is that the simple differences in average welfare 
between households living in and outside GMAs, or that for participants and non-participants 
in CRB/VAGs are not an accurate measure of respective impacts. Fortunately, a number of 
empirical techniques have been developed over the years for cross-sectional data that help to   6
minimize this bias, such as propensity score matching (PSM), and Maddala’s treatment 
regression (two-stage or joint estimation) (Maddala 1983).  
 
With only cross-sectional data from households and communities in GMAs and those in 
carefully chosen comparison areas, we use Maddala’s treatment regression techniques 
(Maddala 1983; Bandyopadhyay and Shyamsundar 2004; Stata Corp 2003) to estimate the 
impact on household welfare. We measure and represent welfare by per capita consumption 
expenditure, which is arguably more reliable than most other measures, such as income. The 
estimable equations for the treatment regression can be written as:  
 
 ) (   ) | 1 Prob(G
/ e a     x δ x   (1) 
          G y x β
/ ln  (2) 
where G takes the value 1 if a household lives inside a GMA and 0 otherwise, x is a vector of 
household and community characteristics and y is per capita consumption expenditure. The 
error terms e and  are assumed to be correlated with the correlation coefficient. For the 
estimation of the impact of participation in CRB/VAGs by the households living in GMAs, G 
is interpreted as participation in CRB or VAG.  
 
Although the treatment regression can be estimated in two stages, we estimate the two 
relationships – participation and welfare regression equations – jointly using maximum 
likelihood techniques. Joint estimation of the treatment model (equations 1 and 2) corrects for 
selection biases from observed data in the model as well as bias resulting from unobserved and 
unknown factors. Maximum likelihood joint estimation of participation and outcome 
equations also allows us to test whether selection biases from unobserved and unknown 
factors are statistically significant.   
 
The results obtained from the treatment regression were corroborated with those obtained from 
propensity score matching (PSM) based on a Gaussian kernel function and bootstrapped 
standard errors. For the PSM approach, the conditional probability of participation, or 
propensity score,  ) | 1 Prob(G x  , estimated from equation (1) was used to match the treatment 
households with comparison households. Unlike the fully parametric treatment regression, no 
definite functional form is assumed in the PSM for the impact equation (2). Instead, the impact 
is estimated as the mean difference in the outcome variable between participants and non 
participants in the matched sub-sample. Inferences are made possible by using bootstrapped 
standard errors of the impact estimates, a procedure that produces consistent estimates of 
standard errors when combined with Gaussian kernel-based matching methods (see, for 
example, Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007). 
 
If the effects of selection bias from unobserved and unknown factors are not statistically 
significant, as indicated by, treatment regression and propensity-score matching estimations 
should be close to each other. Where selection bias from unobserved and unknown factors are 
statistically significant, the propensity-score matching estimates would be biased and the 
differences between the estimates using the two methods should depend on the direction of the 
bias. We found significant selection bias from unobserved and unknown factors using   7
treatment regression maximum likelihood joint estimation approach in some of the estimation 
results. In these situations the propensity-score matching estimations were different as 
expected from the direction of the bias. Where the bias was not statistically significant the 
estimation results from the two methods were very similar.  
 
3.  Results 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis based on the 
full sample (Column 1), as we as for the non-GMA (Column 2) and GMA (Column 3) sub-
samples. About half (49 percent) of all the interviewed households (or 1,289 households) were 
in non-GMA, or control, areas. The asterisks at the end of the last column represent the level 
of significance based on an unequal variance t test between means. On average, a typical 
household has a per capita consumption expenditure of ZMK 846,000 per annum. When 
disaggregated by sub-sample, consumption is 1.7 percent higher in non-GMAs than it is in 
GMAs. However, the difference is statistically not significant at any acceptable level of 
significance. Other than per capita consumption expenditure and a couple of distance 
variables, the rest of the variables are significantly different between non-GMAs and GMAs. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of GMAs and non-GMAs on selected characteristics, August 2006  
Sub-samples 
Variable description  Full sample  Non-GMA GMA     
 (1)  (2)  (3)   
Number of sample households  2,649  1,289  1,360   
Per capita consumption expenditure in ZMK  846,331  853,750  839,359   
Household participation in CRB/VAG dummy  0.09  0.06  0.13  *** 
Age of household head in years  42.42  43.6  41.29  *** 
Female Headed Household  0.25  0.22  0.28  *** 
Education of the most educated hh member in years  6.87  7.45  6.33  *** 
Number of children below 15 years  2.55  2.66  2.44  *** 
Number of female members 15-60 years  1.27  1.3  1.24  * 
Number of male members 15-60 years  1.19  1.22  1.15  ** 
Number of adults above 60 years  0.26  0.3  0.23  *** 
Distance to the nearest all-weather road in km  5.25  3.58  6.86  *** 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km  4.88  4.96  4.8   
Distance to the nearest health centre in km  11.52  11.27  11.77   
Value of consumption durable assets in million ZMK  0.44  0.58  0.3  *** 
Participation in cooperatives dummy  0.15  0.19  0.11  *** 
Number of projects in the community  2.01  1.84  2.16  *** 
CRB generated and got funds from ZAWA past three years  0.09  0.05  0.14  *** 
Number of households participating in the CRB/VAG  1.86  1.16  2.51  *** 
Significance: *=Significance at 10%; **=Significance at 5%; ***=Significance at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Although there is some CRB activity in non-GMAs, it is more intense in the GMAs. 
Proportionately, participation in non-GMAs (6 percent) is only about half that of the 
households in GMAs (13 percent). A similar pattern can be observed with respect to the 
number of households participating in the CRB. The proportion of households participating in 
CRBs that have been funded through community funds from ZAWA in GMAs is almost three 
times as high as that in non-GMAs. 
 
3.1  Impacts of being in GMA and participation in VAGs and CRBs 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show, respectively, the average impacts on household welfare of living in 
GMAs and, for those in GMAs, the impact of participation in CRB/VAGs, comparing PSM 
and TRE estimates. In the areas where the treatment regression estimates are statistically 
significant, negative selection bias from unobservable factors could not be rejected. As 
expected, the PSM estimates of the impact of GMA and participation are significantly smaller 
than the TREestimates. As a result, we focus on the treatment regression estimates for the rest 
of the paper. 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of propensity score matched (PSM) and treatment regression 
(TRE) of average GMA effect on the households in GMA 
 PSM  Treatment  Regression 
Outcome: per capita consumption  Estimates  Estimates           
         (1)      (2)         (3) 
Bangweulu -0.151  **  0.729  ***  -0.76  *** 
Kafue -0.029    -0.444    0.51   
Lower Zambezi  -0.118    -0.362    0.26   
Luangwa 0.260  **  0.744  ***  -0.39  *** 
Overall -0.005    0.665  ***  -0.58  *** 
Significance: *=Significance at 10%; **=Significance at 5%; ***=Significance at 1% 
ATT: Average treatment effect on the treated 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Data from the IGMAW survey, 2006 
 
Substantial differences between the actual and the counterfactual average per capita 
consumption expenditures of households in GMAs near Bangweulu and Luangwa park 
systems, as well as for the overall sample show significant welfare gains to the households 
associated with the GMA institutions (Table 2). Unconditional comparisons of the welfare of 
households in GMA and non-GMA areas in Table 1 hide these relatively large benefits as 
other household and community characteristics of GMA households make them worse off 
relative to households in non-GMA areas (see Column 2 in Table 2). 
 
For the overall sample, 66 percent of the average per capita consumption expenditure may be 
associated with the GMA institution.  However, this impact of GMA is not evenly distributed 
across all park systems. Households in GMAs near Bangweulu and Luangwa park systems 
show significant welfare gains while those near Kafue and Lower Zambezi park systems 
appear not to benefit at all.  
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Table 3. Comparison of propensity score matched (PSM) and treatment regression 
(TRE) of average participation effect on the participating households in GMA (ATT) 
 PSM  Treatment  Regression 
Outcome: per capita consumption  Estimates  Estimates   
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bangweulu -0.074  **  0.858  ***  -0.56  *** 
Kafue -0.240    -0.286    0.13   
Lower Zambezi  -0.118    0.494    0.37   
Luangwa 0.034    0.530  ***  -0.42  ** 
Overall 0.083    0.438  ***  -0.30  * 
Significance: *=Significance at 10%; **=Significance at 5%; ***=Significance at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Data from the IGMAW survey, 2006 
 
Among the households living in GMAs, some households participate in CRB/VAGs. If 
CRB/VAGs provide broad social infrastructures from the hunting licensing revenue, we 
expect all households in the GMA to gain in welfare, on average. However, if active 
participants in these institutions restrict benefit sharing to themselves, we would expect 
participants to gain more in welfare relative to non-participants. 
 
Table 3 shows the impact of participation in CRB/VAG activities on household welfare. 
Households in the GMA areas of Kafue and Lower Zambezi park systems obtain no welfare 
gains from participating in CRB/VAGs. The residents of the GMAs near the other two park 
systems, Bangweulu and Luangwa, seem to obtain significant benefits from participation in 
CRB/VAGs. Overall, GMA households participating in CRB/VAGs consume 44 percent more 
per than their non-participating counterparts. The complete estimation results in Tables A1 
and A2 show various factors and their effects on household welfare. 
3.2  Determinants of being in GMA and participation in VAGs and CRBs 
 
The decision of a household to live in a GMA and, once in the GMA, the decision to 
participate in natural resource management decisions through CRB/VAGs are influenced by 
the circumstances that the household faces both within the household and in and around the 
community. Several factors were considered and the significance of their contributions 
towards explaining these decisions tested with the joint estimations of equations (1) and (2).
4  
In this section we focus on the equation (1). 
 
The results indicate that an average household’s probability to reside in a GMA is directly and 
significantly related to its average distance to the nearest main road, the number of social 
projects in the area, and the viability of the CRB/VAG as measured by its ability to generate 
resources and number of participating households (Column 1; Table A1 in the Annex). 
Female-headed households are also 19 percent more likely to reside in GMAs than are their 
male-headed counterparts. The results further indicate an inverse and significant relationship 
between the household’s GMA status and age of the household head, education of the most 
educated member, value of consumer durable assets, and participation in other area 
cooperatives. All these clearly suggest that households that reside in GMAs are relatively 
more disadvantaged than are those in non-GMAs. 
                                                 
4 The estimation results of the full models are in the annex tables.    10
 
Within the GMAs, household participation in resource management decisions through 
CRB/VAGs is directly and significantly related to education level of the most educated 
member, distance to the nearest main road, distance to the nearest health center, participation 
in other area cooperatives, level of donor project activity in the area, and viability of the 
CRB/VAG (Column 2; Table A1 in the Annex). Thus, the more educated segments of the 
population in the remotest parts of the GMAs are more likely to participate in resource 
management, regardless of the age and sex of the household head and regardless of the 
household’s wealth status. 
 
3.3  Welfare and other factors 
 
As earlier postulated, household welfare, as measured by per capita consumption expenditure, 
is indeed influenced by a variety of household and community factors. We control for a set of 
16 variables to find the impact of GMA and CRB/VAG participation on per capita 
consumption expenditure. The results indicate the majority of the factors postulated to be 
associated with welfare are strongly significant, most at 1 percent level. Most of the 
coefficients also have signs that are consistent with a priori expectations.  
 
An additional year of education for the most educated member and an additional one million 
Zambian Kwacha of consumer durable assets would raise the household’s per capita 
consumption by 2-4 percent and 4-10 percent, respectively. Households that participate in 
cooperatives have 24-36 percent more per capita consumption expenditure than non-
participating households. On the contrary female-headed households have between 15 and 19 
percent less per capita consumption expenditure than their male-headed counterparts. 
 
Similarly, every additional kilometer to the main road or health center is associated with 0.2-
0.6 percent less per capita consumption expenditure. The results also seem to imply that larger 
household sizes are associated with lower welfare levels, regardless of the household 
composition. This is shown and confirmed by the unambiguously negative effects of 
additional members in all the four age/sex groups. The fact that additional working-age adults 
(15-60 years) have an adverse effect on welfare may imply that there are limited income-
generating opportunities in these areas.  As expected, children under 15 years and old 
members over 60 years old have greater welfare-depressing effects than the working-age 
groups.  
3.4  The poor and non-poor 
 
We define asset-poor households as those with values of consumer durable assets below the 
bottom two quintiles. It measures relative poverty in the households living near national parks. 
The impact of the GMA institution as well as participation in CRB/VAG activities on per 
capita consumption is large and positive only for the non-poor households. The impact of 
GMA and participation on the poor households are not statistically significant.  
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Table 4. GMA and Participation impact on welfare of poor and non-poor households 
 GMA  Effect  Participation  Effect 
Outcome: per capita consumption  Estimates    Estimates   
 (1)    (2)   
Asset Poor: Bottom 2 quintile  0.205        0.137       
Asset Non-Poor: Top 3 quintile  0.596  ***      0.536  ***     
Alternate Definition 
Asset Poor: Bottom 3 quintile  0.323   
  
0.182     
Asset Non-Poor: Top 2 quintile  0.657  ***      0.541  ***     
Significance: *=Significance at 10%; **=Significance at 5%; ***=Significance at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculation, Data from the IGMAW survey, 2006 
 
Table 4 shows 54 to 60 percent of the welfare benefits to the non-poor households are 
associated with GMA and participation effect. However, asset poor households enjoy none of 
the welfare gains that their non-poor counterparts are enjoying. This suggests that the GMA 
institution does not benefit the poorest in the community. Moreover, the poor do not gain any 
welfare benefits even when they actively participate in CRB/VAG activities. The results do 
not change when we redefine asset non-poor as the top 2 quintiles. Thus, the bottom 60 
percent of the household appear to gain nothing and the top 40 percent benefit both from being 
in the GMA and participating in CRB/VAG. It appears that elites in the GMA capture all the 
benefits. 
3.5  Community gains 
 
One of the main results of this study is that the economic gains from living in GMA and 
participating in CRB/VAG activities do not go to the poorer sections of the community. The 
top 40 percent of the households appear to appropriate the benefits. One possible reason of this 
variation is that the gains from the GMA institutions may be invested in community 
infrastructure such as schools and health clinic buildings. The economic impact of education 
may not be evident in the short term and newer buildings do not always imply better health 
care. However, if GMAs are associated with improved community infrastructure, they may 
benefit all the sections of the community. To understand investments in community 
infrastructure in the GMAs we look at the average age of the newest infrastructure in the 
community in the GMAs around the four National Park Systems. 
 
In the Park Systems with no household welfare impacts the infrastructure are relatively recent 
(Table 5). For example, in Kafue and Lower Zambezi the average age of the newest 
infrastructure is between 2 and 5 years, whereas in Bangweulu and Luangwa the average age 
of the newest infrastructure is between 8 and 10 years. Thus, it may appear that GMAs that 
show no measurable economic impact at the household level indicate some community 
infrastructure improvements.  
 
Table 5. Age of the newest infrastructure in GMA and control areas across park systems 
(Age in years)  Kafue 
Lower 
Zambezi Bangweulu  Luangwa 
GMA areas  1.9  4.8  10.4  7.8 
Control Areas  4.1  9.3  7.4  2.6 
Source: Authors’ calculation, Data from the IGMAW survey, 2006   12
However, the age of newer infrastructure in itself does not indicate the impact of GMA. The 
newer infrastructure may be built with the help of other NGOs and CBOs working within the 
GMAs in the Kafue and Lower Zambezi areas.  After we control for wealth, community size, 
frequency of meetings by the leadership, number of droughts the past ten years, distance to the 
all-weather roads, NGO-funded projects in the community, and labor contribution by the 
community, the impact of the GMA on the age of new infrastructure disappears for the Kafue 
and Lower Zambezi areas.
5 The new infrastructure is older in Bangweulu and Luangwa not 
only with respect to the respective control areas but also as compared with the GMAs in the 
other two park systems. Multivariate analysis shows no significant impact of GMA on the age 
of new infrastructure in these park systems as well. 
 
3.6  Other regularities  
 
The benefits from the GMA institution as well as participation in CRB/VAG activities are 
unevenly distributed across different park systems.  GMAs near Bangweulu and Luangwa 
National Park areas are associated with positive household welfare effects while those near 
Kafue and Lower Zambezi National Parks are not. We outline other regularities shared by 
these park systems that may have positive or negative influences on the welfare of the 
households living in these GMAs.  
 
There are two types of factors, (a) those likely to have a negative effect on welfare, and (b) 
those likely to have a positive effect on welfare.  The impact results in Tables 2 and 3 are net 
of some of these confounding factors. In other words these are factors other than the GMA 
itself that may influence household welfare in these areas. The average levels of these factors 
are presented in Table 6. More female headed households, less education, longer distances to 
all-weather roads and less livestock indicate less human resources, man-made resources, and 
economic opportunities in and near Bangweulu and Luangwa National Parks. Thus, the 
households living in these GMAs are more likely to be dependent on natural resources and to 
seek benefit from the GMA institution.  
 
The second group of factors in Table 6 also supports this hypothesis. The less economic 
opportunities in and near Bangweulu and Luangwa may explain the migration pressure in 
these areas and higher dependence on income from nature-based activities. Households in 
these areas are more effective with utilizing cooperatives and CBOs as they pay less in fees as 
compared with households in GMAs near Kafue and Lower Zambezi, but earn more from 
cooperatives and CBOs. Households in GMAs near Luangwa show the highest level of 
involvement in CRB/VAGs among the four areas, followed by those in GMAs in and near 
Bangweulu. Higher involvement with CRB/VAGs combined with more effective use of 
cooperatives by the households may indicate a higher level of social capital in these areas as 
compared with those near Kafue and Lower Zambezi.  
 
 
                                                 
5 We don’t report these regression results as the coefficients are not statistically significant.    13
Table 6. Similarities and differences in confounding factors in four National Park Systems 
 Kafue 
Lower 
Zambezi  Bangweulu Luangwa 
Variables with negative effects        
Percent of female headed household  22%  24%  36%  27% 
Education in years  7.5  7.4  5.5  6.4 
Value of livestock in ZMK  1,156,841  449,612  76,987  187,715 
Distance to all-weather road in km  4.8  3.1  6.0  10.5 
Variables with positive effects        
Migration in 5 Years  11.4  10.3  5.5  1.7 
Income from Nature-based Activities  115,253  412,158  695,262  860,078 
Fees paid to Community Based Organizations  1,376  1,905  697  766 
Income from Community Based Organizations  1,722  1,951  2,683  4,009 
Involvement in the CRB/VAG relative to Luangwa  41%  43%  57%  100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Data from the IGMAW survey, 2006 
 
The significance of these factors is that they are different in Bangweulu and Luangwa as 
compared with Kafue and Lower Zambezi. They do not directly explain why Bangweulu and 
Luangwa show the GMA and participation effect on welfare while Kafue and Lower Zambezi 
do not. The impacts are calculated after taking into account these and other confounding 
characteristics of the communities and households in the four areas.   
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Game management areas in Zambia were conceived as controlled hunting grounds where 
people coexist with nature. In recent years ZAWA has started sharing some of the revenue and 
responsibilities with the local communities. The result of this devolution of responsibilities 
and resources has been uneven with respect to wildlife management (Simwanza, 2007). This 
study focuses on the human aspect of the impact of the devolution of rights and 
responsibilities in the GMA. To be precise, we look at the impact of GMA on household 
welfare of those living in it. For those households in GMAs, we also measure the impact of 
participating in two community institutions, CRB/VAGs, which allow households to actively 
take part in natural resource management and decide on how the revenue from it is spent 
within the community.  
 
We find substantial gains associated with living in GMAs and participating in CRB/VAGs. 
Since GMAs are located in relatively remote areas on land unsuitable for intensive agriculture, 
comparison of average consumption welfare between households in GMAs and non-GMA 
areas does not reflect welfare differences attributable to the GMA institutions alone. We find 
significant welfare gains in some GMAs after controlling for household and community 
characteristics. However, these gains are unevenly distributed across various park systems 
around which GMAs are clustered. In particular, households living in GMAs near Bangweulu 
and Luangwa park systems appear to gain substantially from the GMA institution while those 
in GMAs near the other two park systems do not. 
 
We find that not all households in GMAs gain equally. Those households who actively 
participate through CRB/VAGs gain substantially more than those who do not. The gains from   14
participation follow the same special pattern of uneven distribution between the park systems. 
Elite capture of all the benefits from GMAs has been a long standing concern from the days of 
ADMADE. The local institutions such as CRB/VAGs were created to allow broader 
participation of households in GMA related community decisions and prevent elite capture of 
the resources. We find wealth, as measured by consumer durable assets, is not a significant 
factor in participation in CRB/VAGs. Other things being equal, the poor and non-poor 
households are equally likely to participate in CRB/VAGs. However, we find no evidence of 
welfare gains to the poor households associated with living in the GMAs or participation in 
CRB/VAGs. Rather, the top 40 percent of the households derive all the benefits from living in 
GMAs and participating in CRB/VAG s. Thus, while the poor are not prevented from 
participating, they do not derive any welfare gains from it. 
 
Consumption expenditure measures welfare in a narrow economic sense for households. GMA 
institutions may concentrate on improving community infrastructure instead of distributing the 
gains to the households. Indeed, GMAs in some park systems have newer infrastructures than 
other. However, when we control for other factors, such as NGO and community labor 
contributions, we find no evidence of impact of GMA on the age of new infrastructure. 
 
In conclusion, some GMAs are associated with significant welfare gains to those living in 
them and more gains to those who participate in CRB/VAGs. However, these gains are 
captured by the relatively elite households in the community. Community benefits as 
measured by newer infrastructure may not be associated with GMAs, but other contributing 
factors. The devolution of community rights and responsibilities for natural resource 
management in Zambia is not complete. The coexistence of traditional and modern local and 
national institutions makes the devolution of power and resource sharing a complex issue. 
Historically powerful national institutions like ZAWA and local elites have vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo in revenue sharing.  More even distribution of gains from GMAs 
across households near different park systems and across the poor and the non-poor should be 
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TableA1. Factors affecting the household's probability to live in the GMA and, once in 
the GMA, the probability to participate in the CRB/VAG 
      Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
cons  0.707 **  -2.612 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.279)   (0.262)  
park2  -1.099 ***  -0.247  
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.332)   (0.190)  
park3  -0.523   -0.123  
 
Lower Zambezi dummy 
(0.330)   (0.106)  
park4  -0.512   -0.336 *** 
 
Luangwa dummy 
(0.340)   (0.121)  
hage  -0.006 *  0.001  
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.003)   (0.006)  
fhhh  0.193 **  -0.018  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.088)   (0.138)  
maxedu  -0.033 **  0.034 ** 
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.013)    (0.015)   
c0to14  -0.026   0.015  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.019)   (0.030)  
f15to60  0.009   0.071  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.039)   (0.076)  
m15to60  0.058   0.055  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.036)   (0.071)  
m61plus  -0.062   -0.125  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.075)   (0.158)  
kroad  0.008 *  0.008 *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.004)   (0.002)  
kbsch  0.004   -0.011  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.010)   (0.010)  
kheal  -0.002   0.006 * 
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.004)   (0.004)  
vacast  -0.020 **  -0.003  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.008)   (0.018)  
dcoop  -0.388 ***  0.552 *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.098)   (0.157)  
nproj  0.042 **  0.055 *** 
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.019)   (0.017)  
dcfnd  0.617 ***  0.829 *** 
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.159)   (0.155)  
npart  0.097 *  0.203 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.058)   (0.019)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A2. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the GMA, of participating in the 
VAG/CRB 
     
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
cons 13.020  ***  13.580  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.209)   (0.086)  
park2 0.400  ***  0.192  ** 
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.143)   (0.088)  
park3 0.416  ***  0.217  *** 
 
Lower Zambezi dummy variable 
(0.127)   (0.063)  
park4 0.434  ***  0.537  *** 
 
Luangwa dummy variable 
(0.100)   (0.096)  
hage -0.001    -0.001   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.001)   (0.002)  
fhhh -0.186  ***  -0.150  *** 
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.047)   (0.054)  
maxedu 0.043  ***  0.022  ** 
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.010)    (0.010)   
c0to14 -0.132  ***  -0.145  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.011)   (0.011)  
f15to60 -0.063  **  -0.091  *** 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.025)   (0.029)  
m15to60 -0.100  ***  -0.090  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.022)   (0.022)  
m61plus -0.140  ***  -0.186  *** 
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.037)   (0.051)  
kroad -0.005  ***  -0.006  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
kbsch 0.001    0.010  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.003)   (0.003)  
kheal -0.002    -0.004  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
vacast 0.045  *** 0.107  *** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.014)   (0.024)  
dcoop 0.357  ***  0.237  *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.051)   (0.066)  




(0.237)   (0.205)  
Number of observations  2,209    1,112   
Log-likelihood value  -3,405    -1,333   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  297.73  ***  407.06  *** 
Rho   -0.583  ***  -0.301  * 
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA3. Factors affecting the non-poor household's probability to live in the Bangweulu 
Park System GMA and, once in the GMA, the probability to participate in the 
VAG/CRB 
    Bangweulu  Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
hage  -0.014 **  -0.018 ** 
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.006)   (0.008)  
fhhh  0.709 ***  0.061  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.112)   (0.286)  
maxedu  -0.081 ***  0.018  
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.028)   (0.036)  
c0to14  0.011   0.108 ** 
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.033)   (0.045)  
f15to60  0.197 **  0.167  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.083)   (0.125)  
m15to60  0.233 **  0.282 ** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.092)   (0.111)  
m61plus  0.017   0.188  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.162)   (0.235)  
kroad  0.012   0.015 *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.008)   (0.004)  
kbsch  0.018   -0.021  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.022)   (0.020)  
kheal  -0.002   0.009  
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.006)   (0.007)  
vacast  0.161   0.023  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.155)   (0.054)  
dcoop  -0.540 ***  0.741 *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.177)   (0.201)  
nproj  0.017   0.183 ** 
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.029)   (0.081)  
dcfnd  0.413 **  1.190 *** 
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.171)   (0.177)  
npart  0.015   0.185 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.056)   (0.048)  
cons  0.769 *  -2.942 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.425)   (0.387)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A4. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the Bangweulu Park System GMA, 
of participating in the VAG/CRB on the non-poor households 
    Bangweulu 
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
hage 0.006  **  0.004   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.003)   (0.003)  
fhhh  -0.289 ***  -0.161 ** 
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.096)   (0.078)  
maxedu 0.068  ***  0.030  *** 
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.013)    (0.009)   
c0to14 -0.166  ***  -0.175  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.016)   (0.015)  
f15to60 -0.187  ***  -0.130  *** 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.043)   (0.042)  
m15to60 -0.191  ***  -0.166  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.037)   (0.029)  
m61plus -0.222  **  -0.253  *** 
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.089)   (0.092)  
kroad -0.007    -0.005   
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.004)   (0.004)  
kbsch -0.007    0.004   
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.007)   (0.005)  
kheal -0.001    -0.004  * 
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.003)   (0.002)  
vacast 0.097    0.104   
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.092)   (0.092)  
dcoop 0.495  ***  0.189   
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.125)   (0.146)  




(0.193)   (0.147)  
cons 12.960  ***  13.566  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.136)   (0.137)  
Number of observations  513    380   
Log-likelihood value  -696    -422   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  222.31    .   
Rho   -56  ***  -0.56  *** 
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA5. Factors affecting the non-poor household's probability to live in the Kafue 
Park System GMA and, once in the GMA, the probability to participate in the 
VAG/CRB 
    Kafue  Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
Hage  0.011 **  0.030  
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.005)   (0.022)  
Fhhh  -0.440 **  -0.361 ** 
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.176)   (0.150)  
Maxedu  -0.003   0.062  
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.033)   (0.058)  
c0to14  0.106 ***  0.019  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.031)   (0.058)  
f15to60  -0.034   -0.119  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.087)   (0.140)  
m15to60  -0.054   -0.150  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.064)   (0.201)  
m61plus  -0.099   -0.828  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.136)   (0.804)  
Kroad  0.013 **  -0.004  
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.005)   (0.006)  
Kbsch  0.018   0.009  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.031)   (0.038)  
Kheal  -0.029 **  -0.018  
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.014)   (0.029)  
Vacast  -0.432 *  0.358  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.243)   (0.425)  
Dcoop  -0.699 **  0.392  
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.325)   (0.609)  
Nproj  -0.256 ***  -0.171  
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.082)   (0.114)  
Dcfnd  0.013   0.120  
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.249)   (0.477)  
Npart  0.205 *  0.228 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.109)   (0.022)  
Cons  -0.716 *  -3.320 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.434)   (0.908)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A6. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the Kafue Park System GMA, of 
participating in the VAG/CRB on the non-poor households 
    Kafue 
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
Hage -0.001    0.000   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
fhhh  -0.238 ***  -0.442 *** 
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.078)   (0.072)  
maxedu 0.028  **  0.016   
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.011)    (0.014)   
c0to14 -0.125  ***  -0.135  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.016)   (0.021)  
f15to60 -0.003    -0.050  * 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.054)   (0.028)  
m15to60 -0.079  **  -0.122  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.035)   (0.045)  
m61plus -0.152  ***  -0.329  *** 
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.058)   (0.067)  
kroad 0.004    0.000   
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
kbsch 0.002    0.008   
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.007)   (0.013)  
kheal -0.004    -0.008   
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.005)   (0.009)  
vacast 0.020  * 0.448  *** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.012)   (0.128)  
dcoop 0.170    0.235   
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.118)   (0.216)  




(0.389)   (0.231)  
cons 13.792  ***  13.860  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.148)   (0.172)  
Number of observations  612    166   
Log-likelihood value  -862    -167   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  249.10       
Rho   0.51    0.13   
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA7. Factors affecting the non-poor household's probability to live in the Lower 
Zambezi Park System GMA and, once in the GMA, the probability to 
participate in the VAG/CRB 
   Lower Zambezi  Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
Hage  -0.009   0.037 *** 
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.007)   (0.012)  
Fhhh  -0.081   -0.104  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.113)   (0.792)  
Maxedu  -0.005   0.036  
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.014)   (0.042)  
c0to14  -0.068 *  -0.193  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.039)   (0.165)  
f15to60  -0.084   -0.022  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.064)   (0.123)  
m15to60  0.032   -0.019  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.065)   (0.162)  
m61plus  -0.099   -0.397  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.161)   (0.457)  
Kroad  -0.054   -0.018  
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.035)   (0.052)  
Kbsch  0.012   -0.054  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.011)   (0.102)  
Kheal  0.016 *  0.024 * 
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.009)   (0.013)  
Vacast  -0.092   0.097  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.112)   (0.081)  
Dcoop  0.049   0.437  
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.226)   (0.362)  
Nproj  -0.112   0.139 *** 
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.078)   (0.051)  
Dcfnd  -0.343   1.891  
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.398)   (1.534)  
Npart  1.103 *  0.274 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.599)   (0.058)  
Cons  0.075   -4.187 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.610)   (1.317)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A8. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the Lower Zambezi Park System 
GMA, of participating in the VAG/CRB on the non-poor households 
    Lower Zambezi 
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
Hage -0.004    -0.002   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.004)   (0.008)  
fhhh  -0.065   0.103  
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.097)   (0.145)  
maxedu 0.021  *  0.000   
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.012)    (0.010)   
c0to14 -0.128  ***  -0.149  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.026)   (0.036)  
f15to60 -0.105  ***  -0.056   
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.033)   (0.055)  
m15to60 -0.083  **  -0.102  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.033)   (0.036)  
m61plus -0.171  ***  -0.138   
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.060)   (0.163)  
kroad -0.009  **  0.000   
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.004)   (0.010)  
kbsch 0.003    0.007  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.004)   (0.003)  
kheal -0.003    -0.004  * 
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
vacast 0.031   0.211  *** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.026)   (0.039)  
dcoop 0.327  ***  0.239  ** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.066)   (0.101)  




(0.239)   (0.744)  
cons 14.238  ***  13.897  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.223)   (0.239)  
Number of observations  540    230   
Log-likelihood value  -765    -229   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  .    .   
Rho   0.26    -0.37   
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA9. Factors affecting the non-poor household's probability to live in the Luangwa 
Park System GMA and, once in the GMA, the probability to participate in the 
VAG/CRB 
    Luangwa  Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
Hage  -0.009   -0.005  
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.007)   (0.010)  
Fhhh  0.328 *  -0.056  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.172)   (0.217)  
Maxedu  -0.039 *  0.024  
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.023)   (0.033)  
c0to14  -0.056   -0.023  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.039)   (0.057)  
f15to60  0.116   0.138  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.085)   (0.149)  
m15to60  0.109   -0.201  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.072)   (0.140)  
m61plus  0.048   -0.077  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.194)   (0.226)  
Kroad  0.031 *  0.008 *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.016)   (0.002)  
Kbsch  -0.044   -0.010  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.039)   (0.014)  
Kheal  -0.003   0.012 ** 
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.013)   (0.005)  
Vacast  -0.012   -0.012  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.025)   (0.017)  
Dcoop  -0.430 ***  0.565 * 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.165)   (0.302)  
Nproj  0.138 ***  0.045 ** 
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.033)   (0.020)  
Dcfnd  1.344 ***  0.677 *** 
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.365)   (0.243)  
Npart  0.083   0.212 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.086)   (0.021)  
Cons  -0.058   -2.304 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.478)   (0.437)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A10. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the Luangwa Park System GMA, of 
participating in the VAG/CRB on the non-poor households 
    Luangwa 
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
Hage -0.003    0.000   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.002)   (0.004)  
fhhh  -0.134   -0.127  
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.086)   (0.101)  
maxedu 0.060  ***  0.063  *** 
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.011)    (0.012)   
c0to14 -0.133  ***  -0.126  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.018)   (0.023)  
f15to60 -0.099  **  -0.161  ** 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.043)   (0.064)  
m15to60 -0.051    -0.039   
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.040)   (0.053)  
m61plus -0.157  **  -0.181  * 
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.069)   (0.105)  
kroad -0.007  ***  -0.008  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
kbsch 0.024  **  0.027  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.010)   (0.008)  
kheal -0.001    -0.004   
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.004)   (0.003)  
vacast 0.085  *** 0.086  *** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.012)   (0.021)  
dcoop 0.283  ***  0.212  * 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.068)   (0.110)  




(0.164)   (0.197)  
cons 13.282  ***  13.738  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.174)   (0.162)  
Number of observations  544    336   
Log-likelihood value  -777    -432   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  .    .   
Rho   -0.39  ***  -0.42  ** 
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA11. Factors affecting the non-poor household's probability to live in the GMA 
and, once in the GMA, the probability to participate in the VAG/CRB 
      Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
park2  -1.014 ***  -0.366  
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.341)   (0.257)  
park3  -0.532   -0.340 ** 
 
Lower Zambezi dummy 
(0.340)   (0.149)  
park4  -0.434   -0.323 ** 
 
Luangwa dummy 
(0.350)   (0.132)  
hage  -0.005   -0.002  
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.004)   (0.008)  
fhhh  0.255 **  -0.092  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.120)   (0.184)  
maxedu  -0.039 **  0.051 ** 
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.019)   (0.022)  
c0to14  -0.045 *  0.032  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.024)   (0.037)  
f15to60  0.023   -0.059  
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.050)   (0.100)  
m15to60  0.085 *  0.065  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.044)   (0.089)  
m61plus  -0.109   0.045  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.097)   (0.218)  
kroad  0.006   0.010 *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.005)   (0.002)  
kbsch  0.006   -0.011  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.009)   (0.010)  
kheal  -0.004   0.015 *** 
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.005)   (0.004)  
vacast  -0.020 **  -0.005  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.008)   (0.019)  
dcoop  -0.353 ***  0.466 *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.114)   (0.178)  
nproj  0.044 **  0.065 *** 
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.020)   (0.019)  
dcfnd  0.612 ***  0.572 *** 
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.172)   (0.174)  
npart  0.083   0.189 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.054)   (0.024)  
cons  0.734 **  -2.438 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.325)   (0.311)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A12. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the GMA, of participating in the 
VAG/CRB on the non-poor households 
     
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
park2 0.372  ***  0.262  *** 
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.129)   (0.086)  
park3  0.406 ***  0.203 ** 
 
Lower Zambezi dummy variable 
(0.128)   (0.082)  
park4  0.456 ***  0.546 *** 
 
Luangwa dummy variable 
(0.100)   (0.092)  
hage 0.000    0.001   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
fhhh  -0.127 *  -0.158 * 
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.071)   (0.081)  
maxedu 0.045  ***  0.020   
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.015)    (0.013)   
c0to14 -0.120  ***  -0.141  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.013)   (0.013)  
f15to60 -0.030    -0.052  * 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.029)   (0.030)  
m15to60 -0.093  ***  -0.075  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.024)   (0.024)  
m61plus -0.178  ***  -0.303  *** 
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.043)   (0.057)  
kroad -0.004  ***  -0.006  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.001)   (0.002)  
kbsch -0.001    0.009  *** 
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.003)   (0.003)  
kheal -0.001    -0.004  ** 
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
vacast 0.036  *** 0.090  *** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(0.012)   (0.019)  
dcoop 0.308  ***  0.249  *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.051)   (0.078)  




(0.193)   (0.183)  
cons 13.055  ***  13.564  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.201)   (0.115)  
Number of observations  1370    688   
Log-likelihood value  -2071    -806   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  252.05  ***  315.46  *** 
Rho   -0.559  ***  -0.427  *** 
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
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TableA13. Factors affecting the poor household's probability to live in the GMA and, 
once in the GMA, the probability to participate in the VAG/CRB 
      Probit models for the household's probability to 
Variable  Variable description  Live in the GMA 
Participate in the 
VAG/CRB
a 
    (1)   (2)  
park2  -1.284 ***  -0.029  
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.348)   (0.297)  
park3  -0.442   0.131  
 
Lower Zambezi dummy 
(0.349)   (0.236)  
park4  -0.633 *  -0.523 * 
 
Luangwa dummy 
(0.369)   (0.314)  
hage  -0.007 *  0.003  
 
Age of the household head in years 
(0.004)   (0.010)  
fhhh  0.104   0.081  
 
Female-headed household dummy 
(0.113)   (0.227)  
maxedu  -0.022   0.028  
 
Education of the most educated household 
member in years  (0.017)   (0.021)  
c0to14  0.020   -0.067  
 
Number of children below 15 years 
(0.029)   (0.071)  
f15to60  -0.023   0.414 *** 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years old 
(0.057)   (0.145)  
m15to60  -0.004   -0.056  
 
Number of male members 15-60 years old 
(0.063)   (0.142)  
m61plus  -0.018   -0.290  
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.109)   (0.328)  
kroad  0.012 **  0.000  
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.005)   (0.005)  
kbsch  0.004   -0.019  
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.014)   (0.028)  
kheal  0.000   -0.026 ** 
 
Distance to the nearets health centre in km 
(0.004)   (0.011)  
vacast  -5.937   -3.690  
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(3.705)   (8.503)  
dcoop  -0.449 **  1.032 *** 
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.181)   (0.326)  
nproj  0.012   0.018  
 
Number of projects in the community 
(0.041)   (0.037)  
dcfnd  0.543 *  1.599 *** 
 
CRB funded dummy variable 
(0.284)   (0.296)  
npart  0.158 **  0.247 *** 
  
Number of participants in the CRB/VAG 
(0.077)   (0.035)  
cons  0.725 **  -2.858 *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.334)   (0.505)  
aBased only on the sub-sample of households that are located in the GMAs     
Level of significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A14. Impact of living in the GMA and, once in the GMA, of participating in the 
VAG/CRB on the poor households 
     
Treatment Regression models for the impact on per 
capita consumption expenditure of 





   (1)    (2)   
park2 0.192    0.083   
 
Kafue dummy variable 
(0.237)   (0.112)  
park3  0.290 **  0.317 *** 
 
Lower Zambezi dummy variable 
(0.129)   (0.073)  
park4  0.255 **  0.459 *** 
 
Luangwa dummy variable 
(0.123)   (0.128)  
hage -0.001    -0.003   
 
Age of the household head 
(0.002)   (0.002)  
fhhh  -0.048   0.001  
 
Female-headed dummy 
(0.055)   (0.064)  
maxedu 0.023  **  0.015   
 
Education of the most educated member 
(years) (0.010)    (0.013)   
c0to14 -0.193  ***  -0.182  *** 
 
Number of children less than 15 years old 
(0.013)   (0.019)  
f15to60 -0.163  ***  -0.167  *** 
 
Number of female members 15-60 years 
(0.031)   (0.053)  
m15to60 -0.168  ***  -0.175  *** 
 
Number of male members 15-60 years 
(0.029)   (0.042)  
m61plus -0.152  ***  -0.090   
 
Number of members older than 60 years 
(0.048)   (0.067)  
kroad -0.003    -0.005  * 
 
Distance to the nearest main road in km 
(0.003)   (0.003)  
kbsch 0.002    0.005   
 
Distance to the nearest basic school in km 
(0.004)   (0.007)  
kheal -0.005  **  -0.005  ** 
 
Distance to the nearest health centre in km 
(0.002)   (0.003)  
vacast 5.114  *** 4.291  ** 
 
Value of consumer durable assets in ZMK 
(1.705)   (1.993)  
dcoop 0.231  **  -0.066   
 
Participation in cooperatives dummy 
(0.095)   (0.103)  




(0.436)   (0.308)  
cons 13.602  ***  13.751  *** 
 
Intercept 
(0.397)   (0.131)  
Number of observations  839    424   
Log-likelihood value  -1209    -446   
Goodness of fit Chi-Square  329.82    229.86   
Rho   -0.205    -0.05   
aParticipation dummy variable refers to the GMA dummy, equal to 1 if the household is located in a GMA 
bThe participation dummy variable refers to the CRB/VAG dummy, equal to 1 if the household participates 
in the VAG/CRB. This model uses a sub-sample of households that are located in the GMA 
Significance: *=Significant at 10%; **=Significant at 5%; ***=Significant at 1% 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
 